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THE LIE DETECTOR - A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
OF THE TECHNIQUE AS A POTENTIAL
UNDERMINING FACTOR IN THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS
JOSEPH H. KOFFLER

full glare of national publicity, the Mayor of Portland,
Oregon, on March 8, 1957, requested that the United States Select
Committee on Labor and Management, investigating his alleged relationship with gamblers, submit him to a lie detector test.1 On March
12th, in the midst of the lie detector test, he walked out, and with the
spotlight even more assiduously focused upon him, asserted to the committee that the test was "tricky," designed to trip him, and a "fishing
expedition" by the committee aimed at making him "flunk". 2 Senator
Mundt was impelled to comment that he couldn't "think of any witIN THE

ness who has put himself in a worse box than you have.... I'm
shocked and amazed that the mayor of a great city . . . says he's

not going to take a test because he doesn't like the questions."'
An estimated 200,000 persons have been subjected to lie detector
tests during the past 20 years, 4 and with headlines being visited ever
more frequently with accounts of these tests, the public consciousness has been awakened, and as is inevitable in a democratic society
the reflections of the press and public may find expression in the
judicial process. What this expression has been, and what it will be,
is a question that warrants most serious consideration. This is especially so because the foundation has already been solidified for a step
that may carry the courts to a point of no return.
I. STATUS OF THE LIE DETECTOR TECHNIQUE
IN THIS regard it is to be noted that trial courts are, with increasing frequency, looking favorably upon the introduction of testimony
based upon the results of lie detector tests, and the appellate courts
are apparently poised to open the gates to the admission of suc h testimony. The question of the admissibility of the results of such tests
JosEPH H. KorraL is Professor of Law at New York Law School.
1 Accounts of this proceeding appear in New York Times, March 9, 1957, p. 12,
col 2, and New York World-Telegram & Sun, March 8, 1957, p. 1, col. 4.
2 New York World-Telegram & Sun, March 12, 1957, p. 1, col. 4.
3 Ibid.
4 Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 Tsnr. L. REv. 743 (1953).
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is not a long mooted one, the case of Frye v. United States, apparently the first appellate case on the subject, having been decided as
recently as 1923. Commencing with the premise that every reasonable means that science can offer should be utilized in assisting in ,the
determination of a more perfect result at the trial, and recognizing
that there is much room for improvement in the traditional methods
of determining the credibility of a witness, there has been an understandable interest in the utilization of a mechanical device which will
assist in the determination of credibility and in the concurrent attainment of more exact justice.
While the appellate courts have generally awaited further development before sanctioning the admission of testimony based upon the
use of such mechanical devices, the scientists have steadily pressed
forward in improving them,6 and certain trial courts' and congressional committees,' within narrow limits, and the police, 9 private investigative agencies,' 0 governmental agencies,-" and private industry,1 2
within wider limits, have utilized them with increasing effectiveness.
5 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
6 Inbau and Reid describe the historical development of lie detection techniques,
commencing with Cesare Lombroso's "first attempt to utilize a scientific instrument in
an effort to detect deception" in 1895, and proceeding through the various stages in
the development of lie detection devices. INBAU AND REID, LIE DrErzoN AND CRI=xzrAL INTERRoGATiON, pp. 2-5 and 233-235 (3d ed., Baltimore 1953).
7 Harmon and Arthur, The Utilization of the Reid Polygraph by Attorneys and
the Courts, 2 CRam. L. REV. 12, pp. 17-18 (1955); Arthur and Reid, Utilization of
the Lie Detector Technique to Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases, 45
J. Cmn. L. & Canm. 213 (1954).
8 New York World-Telegram & Sun, March 8, 1957, p. 1, col. 4, New York Times,
March 9, 1957, p. 12 i col. 2, New York World-Telegram & Sun, March 12, 1957,
p. 1, col. 4.
9 Approximately 100 police departments are using the tests. Trovillo, Scientific
Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. Rv. 743 (1953). See also, McLaughlin, The Lie
Detector as an Aid in Arson and Criminal Investigations, 43 J. CPmr. L. & CRm!. 690
(1953).
10 "There are 55 personnel consultants who employ the tests in connection with
investigations and personal examinations." Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility,
22 TENN. L. Rxv. 743 (1953).
11 "Several departments of the Federal Government, including the Atomic Energy Commission, and all branches of the Military Services avail themselves of these
tests. The Army, the Navy and the Air Force are engaging in research in the polygraph technique, in general deception studies and in the measurement of psychobiological stresses." Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. REV. 743 (1953).
Floch notes that "at least one state parole board is making use of it [the lie
detector] as an aid in the determination of innocence or guilt for commutation recommendations." Floch, Limitations of the Lie Detector, 40 J. CRm_. L. & CRm:. 651, p. 652
(1950).
12 Dean Wicker observes that "In hundreds of banks, hotels, retail stores and
industrial plants, polygraph examinations have become routine in personnel procedure.
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The lie detector devices that have come to the attention of the
courts have varied as the scientists have progressed in the development of the technique. When the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia was called upon in the case of Frye v. United States, supra,
to determine whether testimony resulting from the use of such a device
was admissible, the instrument in question was a systolic blood pressure deception test. This test was used to measure fluctuations in the
blood pressure of the subject questioned, the purpose being to determine thereby the truthfulness of his responses. 13 Fifteen years later,
the New York Court of Appeals, in the case of People v. Forte,4 had
under consideration a device called the pathometer or psychogalvanometer, which measured the resistance of the body to electric current,
and it was on this basis that truthfulness of response was evaluated. 5
The polygraph, under consideration in 1942 by the Supreme Court of
Michigan in People v. Becker, 6 and in common use today, incorporates a combination of methods for lie detection by measuring
changes in blood pressure, pulse, respiration and electoral phenomenon
of the skin, and with the Reid polygraph the measurement of certain
muscular activity, and it is on the basis of recording these various
reactions that a determination is made with respect to the truthful7
ness of the subject's responses.'

The objectives of these examinations are to protect the loyal and honest employee and
keep him from becoming disloyal or dishonest." Wicker, The Polygraph Trust Test and
the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711, pp. 713-714 (1953).
13 In Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), the
court expressed its understanding of the functioning of the systolic blood pressure test
in stating that "the theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without
conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which
is reflected in the blood pressure. The rise thus produced is easily detected and distinguished from the rise produced by mere fear of the examination itself. In the former
instance, the pressure rises higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the
examination proceeds, while in the latter case, if the subject is telling the truth, the
pressure registers highest at the beginning of the examination, and gradually diminishes
as the examination proceeds."
However, Arthur states that "in 1944 a new questioning technique was developed
by John E. Reid and his various associates discovered that the automatic classifying
of a blood pressure rise as a deception response was, indeed, a gross error!" Arthur,
Blood Pressure Rises on Relevant Questions in Lie Detection-Sometimes an Indication
of Innocence not Guilt, 46 J. CRim. L. & Cam. 112 (1955).
14 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938).
15 A discussion of the psychogalvanic skin reflex or electrodermal response is found
in INBAU AND REm, LIE DETECTON AND CRIMINAL LNTERROGATION, pp. 99-106 (3d ed.,
Baltimore 1953).
16 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942).
17 A description of the polygraph is found in INBAU AND REID, LIE DETECTIoN AND
CRmINAL INTERROGAT ON,

pp. 5-8 (3d ed., Baltimore 1953).
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A. Reliability of the Technique.-The accuracy of the polygraph
technique, as a method for determining deception, is presently the
cause of much inquiry. With reference to this question, it may be noted
that the Chicago, Illinois police department, in reporting the results of
testing 1127 subjects with the polygraph from 1938 to 1941, reported
that 40.0% of the persons tested responded in such a manner as to appear guilty of the crime under investigation, 40.0% appeared innocent,
and the reactions in 20.0% of the cases were too indefinite for the
examiner to make a determination of innocence or guilt. The report
indicated that 85% of those who appeared to be guilty when subjected to the test later confessed, but added that there was, overall, a
proved error of 2.0% in the examiner's findings."8 The Seattle, Washington police department reported that 175 subjects were tested with
the polygraph in 1951, of which 41.1% appeared guilty, 53.1% appeared innocent, and 5% were too indefinite for a finding of either
innocence or guilt. This report indicated that there was a proved error
of 2.3%o in the examiner's findings. 9
Inbau and Reid estimated in 1953 that the polygraph technique,
as employed by the staff of John E. Reid & Associates during the preceding five year period, displayed "when applied under the most favorable conditions an accuracy of 95% with a 4% margin of indefinite
determinations and a 1% margin of error"; 2" or, "in other words, in
the examination of 100 subjects the examiner may make a definite and
accurate diagnosis as to the guilt or innocence of 95 subjects.",' These
conclusions, they report, are based on a study of 4,280 subjects who
were suspected of criminal offenses. In 1955, a more recent report
on testing at the Reid laboratories, involving 8,450 subjects, arrives at
a comparable estimate of accuracy, with the caveat, however, that the
polygraph or any 'lie detector' is "far from the automatic device some
persons think it to be" and that "far less accuracy will prevail...
when the examiner is lacking in basic qualifications, adequate train18 Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENx. L. REV. 743, 758 (1953).

19 Ibid.
0
20 Inbau and Reid state that while they estimate the margin of error at 1%, "the
percentage of known error was .0007 per cent-in other words, 3 known errors .out
of 4,093 subjects. (This figure of 4,093 subjects represents the total number less the
group of indefinites.) On the basis of known figures, therefore, the percentage of error
is considerably lower than the estimated one per cent. There is no assurance, of
course, that all errors were discovered. It does appear, however, that the one per cent
estimate will cover whatever errors may be present." INBAU AND REm, iE DETECToN
AND CmmTnAL INTERROGATON, p. 111 (3d ed., Baltimore 1953).
21 Ibid.
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ing, sufficient experience, general competence, or complete honesty.) 22
Much more cautious in appraising the accuracy of the polygraph,
Eugene E. Levitt, writing in 1955, indicates that he believes the estimate of Inbau and Reid of a 1% margin of error is "too optimistic, 23
and he is in fact unwilling to accept even earlier estimates of a 5%
or 10% margin of error.24 He bases his conclusion primarily on the
large number of factors which can induce erroneous interpretations
of the polygraph record and in this regard he lists the following nine
factors: (1) bias on the part of the examiner; (2) misleading cues
given by the examiner; (3) psychopathology in tle suspect; (4)
physiopathology in the suspect; (5) acute tension in an innocent suspect; (6) intensive interrogation prior to testing; (7) muscular movements or pressure; (8) multiplicity of deception criteria, and (9) insufficient training of examiner.25
B. The Attitude of the Courts-1. Unique Trial Court Application.-Turning from the question of the accuracy of the polygraph
to the attitude of the courts with respect to the tests, it may be observed that at the trial court level certain judges have employed an
interesting approach. For example, Judge Jacob M. Braude of the
Chicago Municipal Court reports using the polygraph test since 1935,
not "for the purpose of determining innocence or guilt of a defendant on trial' 20 but rather "in those cases where the evidence presented
at trial and all circumstances surrounding a particular case pointed
towards guilt and yet the defendant persisted in his plea of innocence.")27 Under such circumstances he states that it was his practice
to-first make the finding of guilty, and then enter a motion to vacate
that finding pending the results of a lie detector test. If the test confirmed his belief as to guilt, the motion to vacate was overruled. If,
however, it indicated that the defendant was telling the truth as to
22 Harmon and Arthur, The Utilization of the Reid Polygraph by Attorneys and
the Courts, 2 Cr . L. REv. 12, pp. 26-27 (1955).
23 Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector" 40 IowA L. REV. 440, p. 450

(1955).
24 Ibid. With reference to the 10% and 5% estimates, Levitt notes that "in the

first edition of his book, LIE DEFcrzoir

AND CRIMNAL INTERROGATION (1942), INBAu
made the 10% error estimate. It becomes 5% in the second edition (1948)."
25 Id. at pp. 451-454, contains a discussion of these nine factors. A fuller treatment
of these factors is found in INBAu Am REIm, LIE DETECTIONS AND CR]ImINAL INTERROCATION (3d ed., Baltimore 1955).
26 Harmon and Arthur, The Utilization of the Reid Polygraph by Attorneys and
the Courts, 2 Cmr. L. REv. 12, p. 17 (1955).
27

Ibid.
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his claim of innocence, he then used the result of the test to provide
him with that degree of doubt which would justify him in finding the
defendant not guilty, because he could then say that he was not satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt.
2. The Viewpoint of the Appellate Courts: a. The Standard
of General Scientific Recognition.-But what of the basic and pervasive question of the attitude of the appellate tribunals that have been
called upon to rule with respect to the admissibility of testimony based
upon the results of such tests? As has been indicated, Frye v. United
States28 appears to be the first reported case in which an appellate
court was called upon to pass on the admissibility of testimony based
upon the results of a lie detector test. In rejecting the proffered testimony the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia stated that
the test, in that case the systolic blood pressure test, "has not as yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition ' 2 as would justify the
court in admitting its findings. Ten years later, in 1933, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in the case of State v. Bohner,30 indicated that
there had not been sufficient advance since the Frye case to warrant
the admission of testimony based on a lie detector test.
As the question of the admissibility of testimony based upon the
results of lie detector tests continued to come before the appellate
courts of various jurisdictions they frequently cited the Frye case,
also indicating in many instances that the question of the scientific
recognition of the test was the critical one. .An interesting example of
this is furnished by the development in-New York where, in 1938, in
the case of People v. Kenny,"' a trial court accepted testimony based
upon the results of a pathometer test. However, the Kenny case did
not reach the appellate level, and therefore much interest centered on
the case of People v. Forte,32 decided by the New York Court of Appeals later in the same year. In this case the court held that it was
not reversible error for a trial court to refuse to admit testimony based
upon the results of such a test. The court stated that the record was
'33
"devoid of evidence tending to show a general scientific recognition
(italics added) of the pathometer's efficacy, and that it would not take
judicial notice of its scientific standing.
28 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
29 Id. at 1014.

30
31
32
33

210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).
219 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (Queens Co. Ct. 1938).
279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938).
Id. at 206, 18 N. E. 2d at 32.
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A similar attitude was displayed by the Supreme Court of Michigan in 1942 in the case of People v. Becker.3 4 The defendant, who
had been tried and convicted of manslaughter, urged that the trial
court had erred in refusing to admit the result of a polygraph test
into evidence. In rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court of
Michigan stated that there was "no testimony offered which would
indicate that there is at this time a general scientific recognition of
such tests." 35 The District Court of Appeal of California, in 1950, in
the case of People v. Wocknick, 36 reflected a similar attitude in sustaining the trial court in its refusal to accept the results of a lie
detector test into evidence. The court, after reviewing the cases that
had been previously decided in various jurisdictions, stated that it was
in accord with the view that the test had not yet gained "such standing and scientific recognition as to justify the admission of expert
testimony deduced from tests made under such theory."3 7
The Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma was confronted with
the question of the admissibility of the results of a lie detector test
in 1951, in Henderson v. State,3" in which case the defendant was convicted of first degree rape. In finding that the trial court had not erred
in sustaining the state's objection to the defendant's tender of the
results of such a test, the court stated that the efficacy of the lie
detector test had not gained that "standing and scientific recognition
nor demonstrated that degree of dependability to justify the courts in
-approving their use in the trial of criminal cases." 39 The following
year, in Leeks v. State,40 the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
reaffirmed this view.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in 1955, in the case of People
v. Davis,4' again took an adverse view towards the admissibility of the

results of lie detector tests. In fact, the Appellate Courts of California,42 District of Columbia,43 Florida, 44 Kansas, 45 Maine, 46 Michi34 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942).
35 Id. at 566, 2 N. W. 2d at 505.
36 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 70 (1950).
37 Id. at 128, 219 P. 2d at 72.
38 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P. 2d 495 (19 1).
39 Id. at 55, 230 P. 2d at 506.
40 95 Okla. Crim. 326, 245 P. 2d 764 (1952).
41 343 Mich. 348, 72 N. W. 2d 269 (1955).
42 People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 937 (1948); People v.
Porter, 136 Cal. App. 2d 461, 288 P. 2d 561 (1955).
43 Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
44 Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (1953). Supreme Court of Florida reversed
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gan,4 7 Minnesota,s Mississippi, 49 Missouri,5 Nebraska, 51 New York, 52
North Dakota, 8 Ohio,54 Oklahoma, 3 Pennsylvania," ° Texas"7 and
Wisconsin,"' have grappled with the question of the admissibility of
testimony based upon various types of lie detector tests, and in each
of the instances, with circumscribed exceptions, they have rejected the
testimony. To the extent that the exceptions are found in three instances, two of them involve criminal cases and one a civil case.
b. Certain CircumscribedExceptions.--The first of these exceptions, found in the case of People v. Hauser,59 involved a situation in
which the prosecution and the defendant and his counsel stipulated,
prior to the defendant's being subjected to the test, that the results
should be received in evidence. The test results indicated that the defendant was untruthful, the trial court admitted testimony to this
effect over defendant's objection, and the District Court of Appeal
of California affirmed. The stipulation had also contained a provision
trial court which had permitted the state on redirect examination to ask the prose-

cuting witness if he had subjected himself to a lie detector test for the purpose of
rehabilitating his credibility.
45 State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947).
46 State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 110 A. 2d 588 (1954). Prosecuting witness' alleged
recantation did not warrant granting motion for new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine took the position that testimony as to results of a lie detector test, to which
the prosecuting witness submitted subsequent to the trial of the action, is not admissible in considering motion for new trial.
47 People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942); Stone v. Earp, 331
Mich. 606, 50 N. W. 2d 172 (1951) (a civil case); People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348,
72 N. W. 2d 269 (1955); People v. Welke, 342 Mich. 164, 68 N. W. 2d 759, 761
(1955). The Supreme Court of Michigan stated: "We believe reversible error was committed by allowing the testimony that clearly disclosed to the jury that not only
was the lie-detector test made but the fact that the man who made the test concluded
and informed the defendant he was lying. The fact that the exact results of the test
were not testified to does not correct this error."
48 State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N. W. 2d 458 (1952).
49 Hawkins v. State, 222 Mis. 753, 77 So. 2d 263 (1955).
50 State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S. W. 2d 43 (1945).
51 Boedhe v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N. W. 2d 593 (1949).
52 People v. Forte, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938).
53 State v. Pusch, 77 N. D. 860, 46 N. W. 2d 508 (1950).
54 Parker v. Friendt, 99 0. A. 329, 118 N. E. 2d 216 (1954).
55 Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Cr. 45, 230 P. 2d 495 (1951); Leeks v. State,
95 Okla. Cr. 326, 245 P. 2d 764 (1952); Hayes v. State, 292 P. 2d 442 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1956), The Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma held that the trial court did
not err in refusing to permit defendant to testify that after his arrest he voluntarily
submitted to a lie-detector test.
56 Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 179 Pa. Super. 64, 115 A. 2d 865 (1955).
57 Peterson v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 255, 247 S. W. 2d 110 (1952).
58 State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933); Le Fevre v. State, 242
Wis. 416, 8 N. W. 2d 288 (1943); State v. Perlin, 268 Wis. 529, 68 N. W. 2d 32
(1955).
59 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P. 2d 937 (1948).
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that the operator who administered the test was an "expert operator
and also an expert in interpreting results of such test," 60 and the court
summed up its position by stating that "it would be difficult to hold
that defendant should now be permitted on this appeal to take advantage of any claim that such operator was not an expert and that as to
the results of the test such evidence was inadmissible, merely because
it happened to indicate that he was not telling the truth."61
A second exception is found in Tyler v. United States.2 In this case
the defendant, who had submitted to a lie detector test, was informed
that the results indicated that he was lying, and he thereafter confessed. At the trial there developed an issue as to whether the confession was voluntary, and the trial court permitted the examiner who
had conducted the test to testify that he had informed the defendant,
prior to the confession, that the results of the test indicated that he
was lying. Counsel for defendant moved to strike this testimony, and
the trial court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, adopted the view that the denial of the
motion was not error because the trial court had informed the jury
that "the statement of the witness that he told the defendant that the
machine indicated he was lying is not admitted as evidence of any
alleged lying of the defendant, but merely as evidence bearing upon
the question whether the confession was, in fact, voluntary. ' 63 The
court stated that it did not mean to impair its ruling in Frye v. United
States,64 that the circumstances here were different, and the evidence
*as received for the limited purpose of its bearing upon the question
of whether the confession was voluntary. The court further pointed
out that the testimony did not reveal the nature of the questions and
answers posed during the lie detector test, and there was therefore
"nothing to indicate to the jury what particular statement Curley [the
examiner] had reference to when he told Tyler [the defendant] there
were indications he was lying." 65
It is submitted that this statement could contain within it particularly explosive connotations. Without reference to the particular
context in which the court made this observation, it would generally
seem inadvisable to accept the view that the prejudice involved in
60 Id. at 695, 193 P. 2d at 942.
61 Ibid.
62 9 U. S. App. D. C. 2, 193 F. 2d 24 (1951).
63 Id.

at 9, 193 F. 2d at 31.

64 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
65 90 U. S. App. D. C. 2, 9, 193 F. 2d 24, 31 (1951).
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accepting testimony based upon the results of a lie detector test is
eliminated or mitigated by a reference to the fact that the defendant
appeared untruthful, without specification. That such testimony
would generally have an adverse effect seems patent, and, in fact, such
effect might often be greater because of the lack of specification.
A third exception appears in a civil case, California Insurance
Company v. Allen. 60 Although this work is not generally directed at
the problems germane to the acceptance of lie detector testimony in
civil cases, the reasoning of the court would seem of interest in view
of the possibility of an extension of comparable reasoning to criminal
cases. This was an action to recover the proceeds of a fire insurance
policy in which the defendant insurance company set up the defense
of fraud, alleging a willful burning of the property. The plaintiff took
the stand on his own behalf and volunteered that he had agreed to
take a lie detector test. The insurance company then offered the testimony of the examiner who had administered the test, and he testified
as to specific questions and answers relative to which the plaintiff
appeared to be untruthful in his responses. The trial court admitted
this testimony for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the plaintiff, but refused to admit it for its general probative effect. The defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the
testimony for its general probative effect, but the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, rejected this contention. This case
is of considerable interest because, as shall be developed in the later
discussion, those who advocate the admission of lie detector testimony
usually point to the fact that its function should be that of impeachment, and yet, here, where the court in fact permitted it for this purpose, the party benefited by its admission, even though not successful
in the action, was not satisfied with any such limitation.
As has been noted, except for limited exceptions, the Appellate
Courts have generally refused to accept testimony based upon the results of lie detector tests. Of equal importance, however, is the fact
that many of the courts are, as has been indicated, merely awaiting
an affirmative answer to the question of whether the lie detector has
achieved general scientific recognition, as furnishing the basis for the
admission of testimony based upon the results of the test.
C. Inquiries Among the Scientists.-The question of whether
the instrument has in fact reached a point of general scientific recog66

235 F. 2d 178 (U. S. App. 5th Circuit 1956).
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nition has thus become a focal point of inquiry. As early as 1927,
Dean McCormick conducted a survey in which a questionnaire was
sent to eighty-eight members of the American Psychological Association, asking their opinion as to whether deception tests combining the
measurement of reaction time, respiratory changes and blood pressure
changes, furnish results of sufficient accuracy to warrant consideration by judges and jurors of such results in determining the credibility
of testimony given in court.6 7 He reported that of those who replied
to this question eighteen answered yes, with varying qualifications,
thirteen answered no, and seven answers were of doubtful classification.6 8
Much more recently a "Survey Regarding the Use of the Polygraph" was conducted under the direction of Dr. Edward E. Cureton,
Chairman of the Department of Psychology at the University of
Tennessee, and Dean Wicker of the University of Tennessee College
of Law, the results of which are reported by Dr. Cureton in the Tennessee Law Review in 1953.69 Questionnaires were mailed to 1,682 persons, including, among others, all persons listed in the 1950 directory
of the American Psychological Association as Fellows of the Divisions
of General Psychology, Experimental Psychology, Personality and
Social Psychology, and Clinical and Abnormal Psychology, which
inquired into their experience with the polygraph and the opinions
they had formed with reference to it. In reporting on the results of
the survey, Dr. Cureton states that "to members of the legal profession, the main question to be answered would seem to be, 'Does the
validity of polygraph procedure for the detection of deception now have
general scientific recognition?' ,a a question to which he does not
find an unequivocal answer as in results of the survey.
II.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS-PART I: INTERROGATION,
EXPERIMENTATION AND AN ANALYSIS OF
CERTAIN CONCEPTS

with pointed reference to the question of general scientific recognition, stated some sixteen years ago, "provided,
of course, that there is a showing of a general scientific recognition of
DEAN HARDMAN,

67 McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALiF. L. REV. 484,
p. 495 (1927).
68 Id. at pp. 495-498.
69 Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 TENN. L.
REv. 728 (1953).

70 Id. at 739.
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the particular device used or proposed to be used, and provided of
course that the particular test is made or is proposed to be made by
a competent psychometrist... judicial approval of the psychometric
method of ascertaining facts would constitute one more step, and a
sound scientific one, in the advancement of the administration of justice, and within the limits above indicated no reason can be perceived
why courts should not now bestow approval. For within limits-within these safeguards-the possibility of error inherent in the present
day use of lie detectors seems materially outweighed by the opposing
71
possibility of closing the door to truth."
Dean Wicker, writing in 1953, and referring to the same general
problem, states that "Mr. Wigmore approves of the admission of scientific experimental tests by psychologists if there is preliminary testimony of a scientist that the proposed test is an accepted one in his
profession and that it has a reasonable measure of precision in its
indications. A re-examination of polygraph interpretations in the light
of all the evidence presently available may convince the courts that
72
this technique now meets that test."
One cannot help but be impressed by the fact that many courts,
scholars and scientists are seeking an answer to the question of whether
the polygraph has now received general scientific recognition, and if
not now, the hand is on the pulse to determine the instant at which
it does achieve such recognition. And then, it is expected that the flood
gates will be opened, and the tide of this testimony will be felt in
the courtroom.
Writing in the Harvard Law Review in the fall of 1956, Helen
Silving, with apparent concern, and recognizing the pressures that
are being exerted in the direction of inducing the courts to accept testimony based upon the results of lie detector tests, advances certain
interesting ideas.73 After indicating that she considers "perhaps the
most forceful argument hitherto advanced against the use of objective
tests is that based on the privilege against self-incrimination,"7 4 and
that an often concurrent argument against admissibility is based upon
the "confession rule,"75 she presents the argument that a "possible
71 Hardman, Lie Detectors, Extrajudicial Investigation and the Courts, 48 W. VA.
L. RFv. 37, p. 46 (1941).

72 Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L.
REv. 711, p. 726 (1953).
73 Silving, Testing the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HAV. L. REv. 683 (1956).
74 Id. at 686.
75 Ibid.
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objection" to the introduction of such testimony would be that its acceptance would be in derogation of our concept of due process. She
asserts that the basic policy issue is the conflict of human dignity
versus truth, or, put in another way, "whether we are to abandon our
traditional system of adversary litigation with emphasis upon dignity
for 'scientific' trial with emphasis upon truth." 6 She urges that due
process, like civilization, is a process and not a status, and should be
looked to in order to assure that there is no eavesdropping on a man's
unconscious.
However, in a pragmatic appraisal of the situation as it exists,
she states that it would "seem that the armory of our law affords
sufficient ammunition for successfully pressing for the admissibility of
objective testimony, and that the chances of such tests being admitted
increase with their growing scientific reliability."" It is submitted,
however, that a conclusion that the armory of our law affords sufficient ammunition for successfully pressing for the admissibility of lie
detector testimony need not be conceded, for when those implements
in the armory of the law that have been pressed in the pursuit of this
aim are tested, it may be found that their metal is weak, and unable
to withstand examination under the flouriscope of legal analysis.
Many arguments have been advanced in favor of the view that
the lie detector test has already achieved sufficient status to warrant
its results being received into evidence, which arguments would assuredly be no less pressing were the test to achieve the enigmatic
cuality of general scientific recognition. But can it be that we are
pressing for the wrong goal, relying on analogies that are only surfacewise sure, and because we are in a new area of the law subject to an
incautious step that can result in grievous harm?
A. For What Purpose Would the Proposed Testimony be Received by the Jury?-An effort to answer this question requires initially a consideration of the purpose for which the court and jury might
be expected to receive the testimony. Dean McCormick suggests that
the results of the test and the expert's interpretation of them would
be received on the following basis: "their immediate purpose is to
show a state of mind of the subject on the occasion of the test, the
state of knowledge of the fact of the crime or other transaction in issue
or ignorance of it. Emotional disturbance tends to show knowledge
76 Id. at 702.
77 Id. at 686-687.

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VOL.. 3

(the inference being from emotion to suppression), lack of it, ignorance. Knowledge may be the basis for the further inference of acts,
i.e., criminal acts may be inferred from knowledge that only the criminal would be likely to have. Ignorance of facts which would be known
by the criminal similarly may found the inference of non-participation
in the crime. . . . The foregoing considerations apply whether the
subject of the test goes on the stand or not. If he does become a
witness at the trial, the results of the tests, so far as they disclosed
suppression-reaction, or failed to do so, with respect to the matter
testified about later in court, would be admissible in impeachment
' 78
or corroboration(italics supplied) of the testimony.
Apparently then, the judge would be called upon to instruct the
jury to limit its use of the testimony (1) to drawing inferences of participation or non-participation in the crime from the subject's display
of knowledge or ignorance of certain facts when subjected to the test
(whether or not the subject testifies) and (2) to be given weight to as
a factor in assessing the subject's credibility as a witness if he does
testify. Query whether the jury would in practice guide itself by such
a charge, and if not, what harm might be occasioned by a failure to
do so? And further, even if the jury did so limit itself, what results
would follow from the acceptance of such testimony? We will address ourselves to these questions.
B. Interrogationof Jurors.-In the case of State v. Loniello &
Grignano,70 pursuant to stipulation, the defendants were subjected to
a polygraph test before trial, with the understanding that either the
prosecution or defense could introduce the results of the tests into
evidence. The judge permitted the examiner who had performed the
tests to display to the jury the plates which illustrated the reactions
to the tests, and to explain his interpretation to them. The defendants
were charged with assault with intent to murder and the results of
the tests, as interpreted by the examiner, "indicated not only a general consciousness of guilt and deception to pertinent questions of a
78 Dean McCormick was apparently considering the use of the results of the systolic
blood pressure test, but the general use to which the court would be expected to put testimony based upon the results of a lie detector test appears defined in this quotation, although variation in scientific detail must be considered where a more complex test is
used. McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALi.. L. REV. 484,
pp. 502-503 (1927).
79 Account of the proceedings in this case, which is said to be unreported, is
found in Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique Admitted as Evidence, 23 J. CRIM.
L. & CsRi.

262 (1935).
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general nature, but also, to some extent, the particular part played by
each defendant in the commission of the crime." 80 The judge interrogated the examiner for the benefit of the jury and elicited from him
the statement that he "wouldn't want to convict a man on the grounds
of the records alone.""1 In his charge to the jury, in referring to the
testimony relative to the results of the polygraph test, the judge stated:
"This testimony does not tend to show or prove any element of the
crime charged. It at most and best only tends to show that at the time
of the examination of the defendants they were not telling the truth.
Now, Members of the Jury, it is for you to give such corroboratory
weight and effect as you think it fairly and reasonably entitled to
'8 2
receive.
The' jury found the defendants guilty of assault regardless of
human life, in a manner evincing a depraved mind, without any premeditated design to effect death, and no appeal was taken by the defendants. After the verdict had been received, the judge interrogated
the jurors as to whether the lie detector evidence had been of any use
to them, and to what extent. The question was put to each juror, each
of whom responded similarly to the effect that the test was of considerable help to him in determining the credibility of not only the
defendants themselves, but also of the witnesses for the state who
contradicted the testimony of the defendants. However, as this was
a situation in which the judge who instructed the jury interrogated
them with respect to the manner in which they proceeded, it is to be
expected that they would inform him that they had followed his instructions. Thus, to the extent that the jurors informed the judge
that they had done so, it would not appear that much significance can
be gleaned from the responses.
In the case of People v. Kenny,83 the defendant was acquitted of
the charge of robbery in the first degree, the trial court having received
testimony based on the results of a pathometer or psychogalvanometer
test over the objection of the district attorney. The jurors were subsequently questioned in an effort to determine just what significance
they had attached to the results of the test in reaching their verdict.84
80 Id. at 263-264.
81 Id. at 267.
82 Id. at 268.
83 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (Queens Co. Ct. 1938).
84 Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. 202, pp. 228-230

(1939).
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Cards were sent to all the jurors requesting answers to questions relative to their reaction to the testimony, and ten of them submitted
answers. It is emphasized that the questions were sent to the jurors
at their homes after the trial was completed, by a person not connected with the court, thus minimizing the coercive element. It should
also be noted that the answers of each of the jurors were independently arrived at to the extent that the other jurors were not present
to influence his responses. One of the questions submitted to the
jurors was, "Were you so impressed by the scientific value of the 'liedetector' that you accepted its testimony without question?" Five of
the jurors answered this question in the affirmative, which led to the
query, "What has become of Judge Golden's closing words, 'The tesimony will be received and the jury permitted to evaluate it' when
five categorically accept it without hesitation and do not 'evaluate' it
in the light of the entire testimony?"8 5 It would appear at least equally significant that six of the jurors responded affirmatively to the question, "Did you base your vote upon such testimony alone?"
C. Experimentation Through the Employment of Hypothetical
Cases.-In an effort to inquire further into the general impact that
testimony based upon the results of a lie detector that might be expected to have upon jurors, the writer has performed some independent experimentation, the substance of which follows.
The attempt has been made to determine how jurors might deal
with such testimony faced with a static fact situation, interjecting at
the appropriate point a negative reaction by the accused to a lie
detector test, and varying the accepted degree of accuracy of the test.
The experimentation produced some interesting results, but these will
be deferred for the moment.
1. The Hypothetical Cases.-A statement of facts was prepared
which contained, in substance, the essential evidence, both favorable
and unfavorable, in the case of a defendant charged with entering a
home with intent to steal. This statement was printed on a card and
the individual questioned was asked to state whether he would, if he
were a juror, find the defendant guilty or not guilty. Each individual
questioned was a third-year law student and the hope was that he
could therefore assimilate the facts and form a somewhat realistic
appraisal, in spite of the limitations necessarily inherent in the procedure. He was specifically reminded that, this being a criminal case,
85 Id. at 231.
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it would be necessary that the defendant be found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict.
There were three cases in all, each printed on separate cards, and
the individual questioned did not know, when the first card was presented to him, that he would be required to respond to a second, nor
when presented with the second, that he would be asked to deal with
a third. Each of the individuals was questioned separately and at the
time of questioning none of them knew that others had also been asked
to respond. Furthermore, none of the individuals was informed of the
purpose of the questioning. The facts of each case were identical except that in Case I the defendant had not been subjected to a lie
detector test, while in Cases II and III he had been subjected to such
a test, the accuracy of which had been established by adequate scientific experimentation, and the results of the test had been introduced into evidence, these results indicating that he was lying. The
only difference between Cases II and III was that the established accuracy of the test was greater in Case III than in Case II.
Cases I, II and III are as follows:
CASE I

A was returning home by foot from a friend's house at night. As
he approached his home (a one-family house) he saw someone rushing out of the front door. There was a dim light illuminating the porch,
and A was on the sidewalk 25 feet away when he saw the man
dash out of the front door. The man turned the other way and continued down the side of the house that was hidden from A's view.
The interior of the house clearly indicated that the intruder had been
searching for valuables.
A later identifies B as having been the man. The identification
is made 48 hours later. C testifies that B was alone with him at C's
home during the time the incident in question took place.
Would you find B guilty or not guilty of entering A's home with
intent to steal?
CASE II

Assume the following has been established by adequate scientific
experimentation:
Out of the persons whom the lie detector examination indicates
are lying when they are subjected to it, 85% are in fact actually guilty
of the crimes with which they are charged. As to 14.5% of them it
is never verified whether they are or are not guilty of the crime with
which they are charged. As to .5% it is later established that they
were not guilty, as they were not lying.

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VOL. 3

Assume that in addition to the facts noted in the problem case
the following is added:
B is subjected to a lie detector examination, the results of which
indicate he is lying.
CASE III

Assume the same facts as noted except that scientific information
has now established that 99.5% of the people who are subjected to the
test and are indicated as lying are in fact lying, and are in fact guilty
of the crime with which they are charged. .5% are in fact innocent.
2. The Results.-Using "I" to signify innocent, and "G" to signify guilty, the answers to the questions presented in each case were
as follows:
Individual

Response to

Response to

Response to

Questioned

Case I

Case II

Case III

A

I

I

G

B

I

G

G

C
D
E
F
G
H
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

G
I
I
G
I
I
I

G
I
G
G
G
G
G

3

I

G

G

K
L
M
N
0
P

I
I
I
I
I
I

G
I
I
G
I
I

G
I
G
G
G
G

Q

I

I

I

R
S
T

I
I
I

G
G
I

G
G
G

A Summary of the answers is as follows:
Case I

Case II

Case III

All innocent

12 innocent
8 guilty

3 innocent
17 guilty

When an individual changed his answer from innocent to guilty
he was asked to state the reason for this change, and if his answer
remained innocent in all three cases, he was asked to state his reason
for persisting in this conclusion. The reasons given for the change, or
failure to change, are as follows:
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A-(Changed to guilty in case III) No reasonable doubt.
B-(Changed to guilty in case II) Beyond a reasonable doubt.
C-(Changed to guilty in case II) Additional evidence sufficient.
D-(Innocent in all three cases) All other facts in case remain
the same. The area of unreliability too large.
E-(Changed to guilty in case III) If penalty were death I would
have a reasonable doubt in case 2, and extreme application of the rule
is the "acid test." But case 3 is sufficient.
F-(Changed to guilty in case II) The case leaves out the effect
of jury's estimate of C's story. What sort of a witness did he make-How did he stand up on cross-examination? But all factors considered
equal, the result is guilty in case 2.
G-(Changed to guilty in case III) Other factors still important,
but A would have to present an extremely strong case to avoid conviction. Unless special circumstances, would convict A.
H-(Changed to guilty in case III) Beyond a reasonable doubt.
I-(Changed to guilty in case III) Guilty on assumption in case
3 because of showing of reliability of lie detector test.
J-(Changed to guilty in case II) All proof is merely tending
to show the truth. I would treat the lie detector test as I would the
testimony of an eye witness who saw the intruder in good light. Thus
I would probably convict him.
K-(Changed to guilty in case II) Should any scientific instrumentality, even though it shows a high degree of probability of guilt
or not guilt have a conclusive effect? However, on the facts given,
without more, assuming no additional evidence can be found I would
find B guilty. Reasons: Scientific aid should play a high part in determining guilt-the lie detector has widespread use and it seems to me
should be given great weight, although not conclusive, especially in
view of the fact that only an infinitesimal amount of persons are later
found not guilty.
L-(Innocent in all cases) If B could be identified by some
physical disfigurement that was clear beyond doubt, such as a hump
back or a decided limp I would find him guilty.
M-(Changed to guilty in case III) A's testimony and accuracy
of machine together show guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
N-(Changed to guilty in case II) A possible error of .5%
plus, would not rebut the conclusion that the man can be found guilty
"beyond a reasonable doubt." In actual jury practice "beyond a
reasonable doubt" does not require virtual certainty. A fraction of a
possible error is always taken when rendering such a verdict.
O-(Changed to guilty in case III) Guilty in view of the accuracy of the machine.
P-(Changed to guilty in case III) In answering cases 1 and 2,
I would find B not guilty of the charge because the evidential situation here is that of conflicting eye witnesses of B's conduct.
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Q-(Innocent in all cases) He may be in the .5%, and until
some objective evidence identified him, I'd be inclined to give him the
benefit of the doubt.
R-(Changed to guilty in case II) Faced with the perennial difficulty of distinguishing a shade of doubt from a reasonable doubt ]'ve
decided my hestitation in the form of a slight doubt or initial hesitancy to convict a man while there is a possible doubt of his being
innocent. Here there was a fairly accurate identification followed by
a rejection of his alibi by an almost perfect mechanical device.
S-(Changed to guilty in case II) This would satisfy mathematical proposition of beyond a reasonable doubt.
T-(Changed to guilty in case III) Since there's evidence outside of the lie detector, I will give this much weight to the lie detector.
3. An Appraisal of the Results.-In view of the fact that in
response to Case I all of the persons questioned indicated they would
find the defendant not guilty, it is apparent that in the absence of
testimony based on the results of a lie detector test, this is not a
close case, and based on testimony traditionally acceptable the defendant would be acquitted. Yet, in Case II, where the results of the
lie detector test are adverse to the defendant, and the results of the
test are characterized as 85% accurate, 14.5% in an area of uncertainty and .5% inaccurate, 8 of the 20 persons questioned changed
their original determination Arom innocent to guilty. Furthermore, in
case III, where the test is characterized as 99.5% accurate and .5%o
inaccurate, 17 of the 20 persons questioned indicated they would find
the defendant guilty. All this, indeed, in the face of the fact that
without any testimony based on the results of the lie detector test all
of the persons questioned would have found the defendant not guilty.
What are the consequences of a psychology that leads first 8, and then
17, of 20 persons to consider that there is proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt when lie detector testimony is introduced in Cases II
and III respectively?
Do we have here a lottery concept? Since no individual ig willing to convict on the basis of the testimony in Case I, and with the
introduction of lie detector testimony of increasing general accuracy an increasing number are willing to convict, is the attitude one
in which such testimony is to be accepted as a substitute for proof
of guilt? A scrutiny of the problem cases shows that, other than the
introduction into these cases of testimony based on a lie detector
examination, the only evidence against the defendant is the identifi-
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cation of one eye witness, whose testimony is subject to considerable
doubt in view of the adverse conditions of time, light and proximity
which mitigated against a certain identification. This is balanced
against the positive assertion of another person that the defendant
was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed. Certainly there
is not in these facts, in the absence of testimony based on the results
of a lie detector test, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It would appear that if a defendant is in fact truthful, but the
results of a lie detector test indicate that he is lying, he will probably
be found guilty, although apart from the results of the test there is
little more than fragmentary evidence adverse to him.
Who are the individuals who would be subjected to such a fate
at the hands of the judicial process? Would all persons be in equal
jeopardy? It may be that certain persons have physical and emotional characteristics that will make it even more likely that, in the
flow of their daily lives, they will be carried down by the quicksand
of such a judicial process.
For example, symptoms similar to those resulting from deception may be found in the case of a truthful individual who is overcome by anxiety due to being under suspicion, or because of fear of
an erroneous test reading."0 Inbau and Reid, under the general heading of "nervousness," list eight causes which may induce such
anxiety.87 They point out that such "nervousness in a lie detector
subject usually is discernible-and its recorded reactions distinguishable from deception criteria,"88 and that "test procedure, involving
a proper pre-test interview and card test demonstration on either the
first or second test, will minimize the number of instances where nervousness will persist as a factor in the testing of innocent persons. '8 9
Levitt, referring to this area of possible error, expresses the opinion
that even the application of all available techniques may not make
possible the complete elimination of erroneous interpretations due to
,'nervousness. 90
86 Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector". 40 IowA L.

REv. 440,

p. 452 (1955).
87
timore
88
89

INmAu AxD RED, LIE DETECTIoN AwD C8IMnmAL INTmERoGAT N, p. 66 (3d ed., Bal1953).
Ibid.
Ibid.

90 Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector", 40 IowA L. Rlv. 440, pp.
452-453 (1955).
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Irrespective of whether this source of error can be wholly eliminated by complete and exacting application of existing techniques,
since it would appear that perfection in the application of the test
could not be expected in all instances, and it would further appear
that certain physical and emotional characteristics of an individual
contribute to his anxiety or "nervousness" when subjected to the test,
then to the extent that an individual is endowed with physical and
emotional characteristics which make him more prone to such anxiety
or "nervousness," to this extent he would be in greater jeopardy than
other persons. Or, put another way, it would be more likely that such
"select" individuals would find themselves in a position where little
more than fragmentary evidence, and erroneous test results, would
result in their conviction.
Furthermore, since intensive interrogation prior to the test "may
induce guilty reactions in an innocent suspect" 9' 1 and "stands as a
highly potential source of error"9' 2 in the direction of erroneous readings of untruthfulness, and since certain individuals, due to their
physical and emotional characteristics may be more readily affected
by such interrogation, to this extent, assuming that such interrogation
will certainly in some instances precede the test, it would appear
that such individuals would also be in the class of persons who are in
greater jeopardy than others.
Various safeguards and procedures have been suggested in the
application of the test, for the purpose of increasing its general accuracy. It has been suggested that there should be standardization of
procedures, and exacting standards of education, ethics, training and
experience for those administering and interpreting the tests.9 3 Furthermore, it has been urged that if the results are to be accepted into
evidence there should be a requirement that both the prosecution and
the accused agree upon the examiner who is to conduct the test, or
that the examiner be appointed by the court. It has also been suggested that both the prosecution and the accused be permitted to conduct independent tests with their own examiners, each of whom would
be permitted to testify.
With reference to these suggested safeguards and procedures,
they assuredly would, with varying degrees of effectiveness, all work
91 Id. at 453.
92 Ibid.
93 See, generally, INBAU

(3d ed., Baltimore 1953).

AND Ram, LiE DTECTION AND CaUnMUL INTERROGATI0N
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in the direction of reducing the instances where an adverse erroneous result is reached. But even so, a realistic appraisal of the situation could hardly lead to the conclusion that erroneous readings will
be completely eliminated, especially in view of the numerous possible
sources of error.

94

As has been noted, although anxiety in the suspect is in most
instances apparently capable of ascertainment and corresponding correction, it would be unrealistic to presume that it will be discovered
and adequately compensated for in every instance. Furthermore, it
would seem beyond any reasonable expectation to envisage the complete elimination of intensive interrogation and physical abuse prior
to examination, both of which are important sources of error 5 Serious and thoughtful training programs may do much to eliminate incompetent examiners, probably the greatest source of error today, and
ethical standards may be improved and carefully guarded. 6 But if
the field is greatly expanded, as will certainly be the case if the courts
sanction the admission of lie detector testimony, there will correspondingly be created the difficulties inherent in effectively assuring the competence and ethical standards of a larger group. It would therefore
seem fair to conclude that while much may be done in the direction
of minimizing the margin of error, it certainly cannot be eliminated
in the application of existing techniques.
Problem Case III, discussed above, presents a situation which
may be relevant at this point. It is assumed therein that the test has
achieved such accuracy that in 99.5% of the cases, or in 199 out of
each 200 cases, the test is accurate, placing only one person in 200
in the category of the individual who, unknown and undiscovered,
presents an erroneous reading. The results of this problem case, when
compared with problem Case II, would seem to indicate that as you
reduce the margin of error in the lie detector process you increase
the probability of the wrongful conviction of persons who fall within
this margin of error. Thus we have the apparently anomalous, although not truly anomalous, situation in which progressive reduction
94 For discussion of the sources of error, see INBAU AND REID, LIE DETECTION AND
CRIN=IAL INTERROGATION (3d ed., Baltimore 1953) and Levitt, Scientific Evaluation
of the "Lie Detector," 40 IoWA L. REv. 440, pp. 451-456 (1955).
95 Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector", 40 IoWA L. REv. 440, p. 453
(1955); INBAU AND REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRrMINAL INTERROGATION (3d ed., Balti-

more 1953).
96 See, generally, INBAU

(3d ed., Baltimore 1953).
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of the area of errorin the lie detector technique will correspondingly
increase the probability of grave injustice to the individuals who fall
within this area.
4. Summary of Conclusions--SignificantAspects.-Some of the
significant conclusions with respect to what would follow in the
wake of acceptance by the courts of lie detector testimony, as developed in the foregoing analysis, may be summarized as follows:
First: Individuals will be convicted on the basis of little more
than fragmentary evidence and the erroneous adverse reading of a lie
detector test.
Second: Certain individuals would be more prone than others to
this kind of jeopardy, because in their cases, due to their physical
and emotional characteristics, an erroneous adverse reading of a lie
detector test is more likely to occur.
Third: As the margin of error in the lie detector technique is reduced, less will be required in the form of other evidence in order to
convict, and it will thus become progressively more likely that the
person with an erroneous adverse reading of a lie detector test will
be wrongly convicted.
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS-PART II: AN ANALYSIS
OF ADDITIONAL FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
IT HAS been suggested, as noted above, that the jury should be
instructed to use lie detector testimony only for the purpose of drawing inferences of participation or non-participation in the crime from
the subject's display of knowledge or ignorance of certain facts when
subjected to the test, whether or not he testifies; and for the additional purpose of assessing the subject's credibility if he does testify.
But even if the jurors could and should confine their deliberations
within the framework of such a charge, it would appear that if the
impact of the testimony is as great as may be gleaned from the above
described experimentation, the charge would not materially affect the
result. For, if you instruct a juror that he is to use the testimony
to draw inferences of participation or non-participation in a crime
from the subject's display of knowledge or ignorance of certain facts
when subjected to the test, and if in fact the subject's reactions are
erroneously interpreted, and if the impact of such evidence is as great
as has been indicated, then the conclusion of participation in the
crime will almost certainly follow, and this individual may be found

19573

THE LIE DETECTOR

guilty of a crime which he has not committed although the other evidence that has been marshalled against him would otherwise be patently insufficient. Similarly, if we say that the evidence is to be used to
impeach the credibility of the subject as a witness, then there will
be a mechanical destruction of his credibility, and this, when coupled
with the apparent impact of such testimony upon the jurors, still
leaves the subject in a position where rather than being assured a fair
trial in the traditional sense that he must be found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, he is instead assured that no such requirement shall
in fact prevail in his case.
A. Circumstantial Evidence and the Concept of Probability.We may now consider the concept of probability, which is applied in
other areas of evidence as a basis for determining admissibility. Much
has been made of this concept by way of analogy, and as the basis
of what has been advanced as perhaps the major argument for acceptance by the courts of testimony based on the results of lie
detector tests. Although this citadel of reasoning has apparently remained immune from penetration, an effort will be made to deal with
it at this point. The lines of the argument are clearly drawn by Dean
McCormick, who states that "it is apparent that nothing like a hundred per cent correctness of results is required"9 7 and the courts should
accept the evidence "if the test results are shown by scientific experience to render inferences of consciousness of falsity or truth substantially more probable."' 8 He points out that "the admission of evidence that blood-hounds have followed a trail from the crime to the
whereabouts of the accused, of evidence of similarity of foot-marks,
and of conduct to show insanity, are all striking examples of the fact
that conclusiveness in the inference called for by the evidence is not
a requirement for admissibility." 99 There is, in effect, a tendency to
take the position that the admissibility of lie detector testimony should
be judged by the same criteriaof probability that generally determines
the admissibility of circumstantial evidence.
Let us examine certain typical examples of circumstantial evidence, and the use to which such evidence is put, in order to determine whether the situation is in fact analogous to lie detector testimony. For this purpose we shall use two examples:
97 McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CAmn. L. REv. 484,
p. 500 (1927).
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
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(a) An earring is found in the hand of the deceased, and a similar single earring is found on the person of the accused.
(b) Footprints similar to those made by the shoes of the accused are found on a path near the scene of the crime.
It is submitted that in each of these instances the weight which
the jury will give to the circumstantial evidence, if admitted, would
be governed by considerations such as the following:
First: The identification of the person with the fact thought to
be significant.
Second: The identification of this fact with a class of one or more
persons, which in turn identifies the person with this class.
Third: A consideration of the size of this class.
Fourth: A consideration of the degree of closeness with which
the class is associated with the crime.
Considering these four factors, as applied to examples (a) and
(b), it would appear that the amount of weight the jury will give
the evidence in each instance depends on how closely it associates the
particularindividual to the particular crime.
For instance, in example (a) the earring is the fact thought to be
significant,.. the person is identified with a class by virtue of being in
possession of an earring of this type and this class is relatively small
if the earring is of a distinctive type, since not many persons will be
in possession of, or have access to, such earrings. Finally, this class
is closely associated to the crime by virtue of an earring being found
in the hand of the deceased. Thus, the individual has been identified
with a relatively small class which is in turn closely associated to the
crime and it may be expected that the jury will therefore give considerable weight to this circumstantial evidence.
In example (b) the footprint is the fact thought to be significant,
the person is associated with a somewhat larger class of persons who
wear that type of shoe, and the class is not as closely associated with
the crime, assuming the footprint is discovered on a well travelled
path. The class being larger, and the association of the class with
the crime being more remote, it may be expected that the jury will
give much less weight to this piece of circumstantial evidence.
Each of the examples is offered as merely illustrative of the fact
that, based on the peculiar circumstances of a given case, the weight
given to the evidence is dependent upon the identification of the person with the fact thought to be significant, the identification of this

19571

THE LIE DETECTOR

fact, and thereby the person, with a class, the size of the class and
the closeness with which the class is associated with the crime. Thus,
if the class is small, but not closely associated with the crime the
evidence will be less strongly weighed against the individual than
would be the situation if such a class were closely associated with the
crime. Similarly, if the class is larger, the closeness or relative remoteness with which it is associated with the crime will be the addi,tional factor to be considered in determining the weight to be given
to the evidence.
However, lie detector evidence is fundamentally different in its
effect. The truthful individual who is indicated as lying by the results of a lie detector test is subjected to very great suspicion not
because he, as an individual, is identified with a peculiar fact which
in turn associates him with a small class that is intimately associated
with the crime, but merely because his body does not react in accordance with the norm, or the test readings are erroneous for some
other reason. Therefore, the argument that lie detector evidence
should be admitted because it contains the degree of probability required for the admission of circumstantial evidence must fail because,
as noted, the purpose, the manner of application,the use and effect of
these two types of evidence is wholly dissimilar.
With further reference to the application of the concept of probability, the following illustration of the fundamental difference in operation between lie detector evidence and circumstantial evidence may
be considered. Let us assume an example somewhat similar to the
one which was used in the experimentation conducted by the writer
and discussed above. A man is picked up by the police and is identified by a woman as a man she caught a glimpse of as he was hurrying out the back door of her apartment in semi-darkness. He is a respectable citizen. A reputable witness swears that he was with the
accused, at a different place, at the time this event occurred. The
accused is subjected to a lie detector test and the results indicate
that he is lying. He is convicted by a jury and since a question of
credibility is involved the conviction is not reversible. His guilt has
been determined by a test that is in no way related to the circumstances of the alleged crime. If the jury were presented with this
case without the results of a lie detector test, they would require that
circumstantial evidence be introduced before they would convict him.
The jury would require, for example, that a footprint matching his
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be found outside the door of the apartment and that a handkerchief
discovered in the apartment bear the initials of the accused. If an individual is convicted in such a case without requiring evidence comparable to the footprint and the handkerchief, considerably less ,is
being required to pronounce this individual guilty of the crime with
which he is charged than has been required in the past.
With additional reference to the question of circumstantial evidence, and viewing the question from still another perspective, it
would appear that if A, B, C and D are all law-abiding individuals
there is no more likelihood that A will be convicted of a crime he did not
commit on the basis of circumstantial evidence than there is that
B, C or D will be convicted of a crime he did not commit on the
basis of circumstantial evidence. But if the results of lie detector
tests are admitted as evidence, and A is more susceptible to an erroneous adverse reading because of his physical or emotional characteristics, then A will go through life with a greater likelihood that he will
be convicted of a crime he did not commit than will B, C or D, who
are less susceptible to an erroneous adverse reading.
B. Expert Opinion Testimony and the Concept of Probability.Another major argument that has been advanced in furtherance of the
view that lie detector testimony should be admitted, is that lie detector testimony is expert testimony, and expert testimony with no
greater exactness is presently admitted. As early as 1941, Dean Hardman, noting that expert opinion evidence is admissible as to analogous
scientific matters, in which the best scientists not infrequently differ
in their conclusions, was impelled to ask, "why should courts be unwilling to admit this particular kind of opinion evidence, provided
of course, that the psychometrist is a duly qualified expert on the subject? If the acceptance of such evidence would tend in any substantial degree to increase the probabilities of arriving at the truth in a
case, is there any sound objection, in view of recent advancements in
the lie detector methods, to admitting the evidence for what it may be
worth?"10 He further urged that "even the margin of probabilities
(italics added) involved in the estimated minimum efficiency of the
lie detector method would seem to fall well within the general judicial
requirement."'' 1
100 Hardman, Lie Detection, ExtrajudicialInvestigations and the Courts, 48 W. VA.
L. REV. 37, p. 38 (1941).
101 Id. at 44.
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This premise may be examined by a consideration of what is generally the purpose and effect of expert testimony presently accepted
by the courts, as compared with what would be the purpose and effect
of expert lie detector testimony. A consideration of certain specific
forms of expert testimony, such as fingerprint, ballistic and handwriting testimony may be revealing in this regard.
Expert fingerprint and ballistic testimony possess the attribute
of relative certainty," 2 but it is not necessary to draw the distinction
between such testimony and lie detector testimony on this ground
alone. A fundamental distinction is found in the fact that whatever
reliance is placed upon the opinion of the fingerprint or ballistic
expert, and it is certainly great, his testimony is directed at establishing a fact which, once established, results in the acceptance of
this fact as a piece of circumstantial evidence. If, therefore, in accordance with the analysis presented in the foregoing pages, we reject the view that lie detector testimony should be admitted because
circumstantial evidence with no greater degree of probability is admitted, it appears that we would accordingly be required to reject
the argument that lie detector testimony should be admitted because
expert fingerprint and ballistic testimony is admitted, since this testimony is, in fact, directed at establishing circumstantial evidence.
For the same reasons, the fact that the courts presently accept
the testimony of a handwriting expert, or any other expert, whose
testimony is, in a given instance, directed at establishing circumstantial evidence, does not afford a persuasive argument for the acceptance by the courts of lie detector testimony.
There are instances, however, such as prosecutions for forgery,
where the testimony of the handwriting expert is directed at establishing the ultimate fact in issue. In such cases the degree of definitiveness with which the expert may speak depends, in good measure,
upon the extent of the handwriting specimen. °3 If the amount of
102 With respect to ballistics, Burrard states that "the methods employed are based
on the fact that it is humanly impossible to make any two articles absolutely identical
when they are viewed under the microscope." BuRRARD, THE IDENTmICATiO OF FiREARas AN FoaR sic BATTsics (1934).
On the question of fingerprint identification, Wehde and Beffel note that they
were able to transfer a print from one object to another. They also indicate that the
best estimat6 of the likelihood of two persons having the same fingerprint is only once
in 64,000,000 times, and that one authority has put the ratio as one in 1,000,000,000,.
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.
WEDE AND BErn,
FiNGERPRINTS CAN BE FORGED, Chapters 3 and 12 (1st ed., Chicago 1924).
103 Baker states that "only one distinctive characteristic in the disputed writing
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writing to be analyzed is small, the opinion will carry less authority
than it would if the writing were extensive. Furthermore, the jurors may
form their conclusions on the basis of understandable visual evidence,
presented and explained by the expert. 0 4 Experts may testify for
both sides, and even though they differ in their conclusions, they may
develop for the jurors an understanding of the basis upon which they
arrive at their conclusions and the degree of exactness that may be
expected in the opinions, depending upon the nature and extent of the
writing.
Contrast this situation with the testimony of a lie detector expert. He would testify not in a comparatively few cases of a limited
nature, but in the whole gamut of criminal cases, including those involving capital punishment. The "specimen" is the subject's body,
and if the test results are erroneous the jury will be in no position to
evaluate or discount them. Even though a test might be performed
by an expert chosen by the defendant as well as one chosen by the
prosecution, or by a single expert upon whom the parties agree, the
subject's peculiar physical and emotional characteristics may lead in
the direction of an erroneous adverse reading. These factors, coupled
with the very great weight which it appears the jury would give to
lie detector testimony, sets it apart in its implications from the forms
of expert testimony presently admissible, even when the presently admissible testimony is directed at establishing the ultimate fact in issue.
It would appear, therefore, that the fact that such expert testimony
is presently acceptable does not afford a persuasive reason for the acceptance of expert lie detector testimony. And finally, even if these
considerations are rejected, a tenuous comparison with other forms
of expert testimony presently admissible would not sustain the proposeldom or never justifies a definite conclusion, but where the number of identifying

characteristics increases, the weight of evidence multiplies by geometric progressions until
all probability of coincidence disappears. Where this is the case, the identificaton is
irresistible and &nclusive.. . . In order to have value as testimony for identification,
an opinion cannot be based on a single characteristic occurring in an individual's
handwriting but the opinion must be based on the particular combination of characteristics which comprise and distinguish his personal writing habit." BAKER, LAW or
DISPUTED AND FORGED Docum.FmNTs, pp. 23-24 (Ist ed., Charlottesville 1955).
104 Baker notes that "the value of expert [handwriting] evidence is that it is not
merely an opinion, but is evidence supported by clear and explicit reasoning associated
with descriptive photographs. Such evidence is of the highest order and rank. Value
.depends on the quality and character of evidence based on perceptible facts comprehensible to observers, and when they are clearly seen and understood, the value is multiplied." BAxE, LAW OF DIsPUTED AND FORGED DocumENTs, p. 22 (1st ed., Charlottesville 1955).
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sition that expert testimony of this unique nature should be accepted
if its acceptance would, in fact, be followed by the serious consequences which have been discussed in the foregoing pages.
C. Self-Incrimination.-If the arguments that have been advanced in favor of the admission of lie detector testimony are countered by the considerations and the analysis which have been developed herein, it would not appear necessary to rely, in resisting such
testimony, upon the contention that its acceptance would violate the
privilege against self-incrimination. This contention is based upon the
view that if submission to the test were required, this would involve
obtaining from the subject, by means of involuntary bodily responses,
testimony which could be used against him, and thus, in effect, cause
the subject to incriminate himself.
Although this argument has been described as "perhaps the most
forceful argument hitherto advanced against the use of objective
tests,' 10 5 the appellate courts have been generally unimpressed by
it,106 and have repeatedly asserted, as has been noted, that the sanctioning of lie detector testimony merely awaits the day when the test
receives general scientific recognition.
105 Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REv. 683,
p. 686 (1956).
106 In discussing the question of the privilege against self-incrimination as it
effects the admissibility of lie detector testimony, Dean Hardman writes that "it has
been suggested by some that the admission of such evidence would violate the privilege
against self-incrimination unless the accused suspect voluntarily subjects himself to the
test. Such an objection, however, seems untenable, for despite some dissent it is now
generally held that the privilege applies only to compelled testimony as distinguished
from nontestimonial evidence, and it would seem that recordations of a lie detector do
not constitute a testimonial utterance within the meaning of the privilege inasmuch as
the evidentiary value of the data sought to be used in court lies in the physical reaction
of the person subjected to the test rather than in the words used by him. That this is
so is indicated by the fact, among others, that the recordations are substantially the
same whether the person taking the test answers the questions or remains silent. The
privilege against self-incrimination closes one of the doors to truth and therefore courts
are inclined, and rightly, to confine the privilege within narrow limits and so to refuse
to apply it to compelled nontestimonial data. For example, according to the better
view the privilege does not apply to involuntary X-rays, or involuntary finger-printing,
or to requiring one to stand up in court for purposes of identification, or even to
utter words for purposes of identifying the speaker, and no reason can be perceived
why the physical reactions evidenced by a compulsory deception test should not be
placed in the same category as other nontestimonial matters." Hardman, Lie Detection,
Extrajucdicial Investigations and the Courts, 48 W. VA. L. REV. 37, pp. 38-40 (1941).

Some question is raised, however, by a decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois
in which the court, in refusing to accept a confession which followed the involuntary
application of the test to an accused, expressed the view that the lie detector may not
be used on an accused without his consent. The court did not, however, state that
its opinion was based upon the privilege against self-incrimination, and, in fact, expressed no basis for its conclusion. People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N. E. 2d 336 (1946).
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It is in the hope that the courts may still be dissuaded from opening the flood gates to lie detector testimony on this "appointed day"
that an effort has been made in the foregoing pages to dismantle the
arguments that comprise the armory upon which reliance has been
placed in the making of this appointment. And if the analysis presented in these pages does, indeed, shed a true light upon the implications that would be inherent in the acceptance of such testimony,
then it would appear that there is here at stake much that is fundamental to the Anglo-Saxon concept of the judicial process.
IV. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS-PART III: PRESENT AND
PROSPECTIVE USE OF THE TECHNIQUE OUTSIDE THE
COURTROOM, WITH SUGGESTED SAFEGUARDS
TiaExE are, however, areas outside the trial where the lie detector
methodology has been used productively and where it may be utilized
to furnish ever increasing benefits. Efficient use has been made of
the lie detector in the interrogation of suspects by law enforcement
agencies, as a result of which clues have been elicited which have
resulted in the solution of crimes and thereby in the conviction of the
guilty. Conversely, the device has been used to assist in establishing the
innocence of persons who might otherwise have been wrongfully convicted. In this regard, a suspect may be tested, and the concurrence of
a general sparcity of evidence and an indication that he is truthful
upon being subjected to the test, may lead to a refusal to prosecute.
In this manner, those who are innocent and react in accordance with
the norm when subjected to the test may be assisted by the employment of the device, and the ends of justice thereby effectively served.
With regard to the serious problem which Dean McCormick
poses of the propensity of the police to obtain confessions by the
use of the "sweatbox, the rubber hose [and] the electric battery,"1°7
here again the technique may be put to good use in tending to eliminate this abuse. It is not unreasonable to assume that when these
tactics are employed by the police they are often founded upon the
belief that the truth is thereby being obtained. With this in mind,
it would appear less likely that there would be an attempt to so extort
a confession if the suspect has been subjected to the test and the
results indicate non-complicity in the crime.
107

McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15

484, p. 501 (1927).

CALIF.

L. REV.
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The diminished likelihood that a confession will be extorted by
force, together with the fact that a prosecuting attorney will be prone
not to prosecute when confronted with an insubstantial case and an
indication that the individual is telling the truth when subjected to
the test, should prove of considerable benefit to those who are innocent and react to the test in accordance with the norm. There is, of
course, implicit in such procedures and policies the likelihood that
some guilty persons, whose guilt is not indicated by the test, may not
be prosecuted, but increasing the effective application of the test
should steadily diminish this group. And, in the final analysis, considering the accuracy of the test, there will be ferreted out and convicted a preponderently greater number of guilty individuals, who
would otherwise avoid conviction, than there will be guilty persons
who are not prosecuted, and this latter group should be small indeed. At most, it would appear that on rare occasions a guilty person would be spared prosecution, and this would be counterbalanced
by the guilt of many being correctly determined and the innocence
of many correctly recognized. And all this would be accomplished
without the awesome eventualities, which have been discussed at
length, that could occur if the results of the tests were admitted into
evidence at the trial.
However, even here, a caveat must be added. If the test is given
general usage and prosecuting attorneys prosecute only those who are
found to be lying when subjected to the test, and the public, through
the organs of public information, become apprised of this fact, a serious danger will present itself. The jurors, reflecting this public knowledge, may well assume that those who are prosecuted were found to
be lying when subjected to the test. This factor could weight heavily
upon their ultimate decision, and the individual who is truthful, but
who was thought to be otherwise when subjected to the test, might
in fact be confronted with an injustice comparable to that which
could have occurred if the results of the test had been received in
evidence.1 0 8 Inadvertently, an indirect route should have been fol108 It has been suggested that the effective use of the lie detector depends on the
cooperation of the subject, and that therefore there are no real problems involving the
application of the test to an uncooperative subject, since no significant results can be
arrived at when the subject does not cooperate. However, this suggestion fails to
take into consideration the fact that if prosecuting attorneys make a general practice
of administering the test, and concurrently adopt the general attitude of prosecuting
only those who are indicated as lying when subjected to the test, they would assuredly
add to this group those who refuse to cooperate in taking the test. Furthermore, and
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lowed, leading to a destination sought to be avoided, and the fabric
of our concept of justice might be torn by a glancing blow, as we attempt to preserve it from frontal attack. In order to avoid this pitfall, it would appear advisable that prosecuting attorneys should
not use the results of the test as the decisive or nearly decisive element in determining whom they should prosecute, and concurrently,
the public should be made fully aware of this fact.
In addition, as an added safeguard, it might be advisable to have
the judge inform the jury in each case that the fact that an individual is being prosecuted is not an indication that the results of a
lie detector test indicate he was lying. Furthermore, the judge might
add that since in individual cases the test is 100% wrong, both the
prosecution and the defense have been denied the privilege of introducing into evidence results of the test that are favorable to either
side.
At this point, however, the question might be raised as to whether
it would not be advisable to permit a defendant to introduce the
results of the lie detector test into evidence if they are favorable to
him. But here again we are confronted with a situation in which the
problem of public information is involved. If the test achieves general usage, and the public is conscious of this fact, and of the added
fact that the results may be introduced only if favorable to the defendant, then we face the probability that the jurors will assume that
the results of the test are unfavorable to the defendant if they are
not offered into evidence. In this manner we would again, by indirection, arrive at a destination which we sought thoughtfully and
directly to avoid. It is, of course, true that such a situation would
result only if the test had achieved general usage, and the public
was informed to the extent indicated, which might persuade one to
the view that until these factors exist the courts should receive into
evidence the results of the test when favorable to the defendant.
However, such a psychology could have within itself the element of
self-destruction. For, once the courts have become accustomed to acprobably more significant, if the courts were to accept the results of lie detector tests
into evidence whether or not the subject voluntarily submitted, it would seem to follow that they would also accept testimony to the effect that a subject refused to submit to a test or failed to cooperate in taking the test. The jury could accordingly draw
serious adverse inferences with respect to a person who refused to submit to the test,
or failed to cooperate in taking the test. Therefore, the fact that an accurate reading
may not be obtained from an uncooperative subject does not eliminate or minimize
the problems involved in this area.
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cepting the results of the test under such circumstances, how is the
line to be drawn and the reversal to be accomplished? At such time
as the use of the test becomes general, and the public informed,
inertia, stare decisis, and the inability to face up to the affirmative
requirement of changing a then established precedent, would mitigate
against a change at that time. And, as a result, by establishing such
a precedent now we should quite forseeably arrive at a result which,
in a relatively short time, would have a solidly fixed foundation of
just the sort we have striven to avoid.
There is the additional question of whether confessions obtained
after a lie detector examination has been administered to the subject
should be accepted in evidence. In certain instances the courts have
taken the position that the mere fact that a lie detector test preceded
a confession and induced the defendant to confess is not sufficient
reason for excluding the confession,'0 ° while in other cases the confession has been excluded.110 There is certainly much benefit to be
obtained from confronting a suspect with the implications of the results of a test, and thereby eliciting a confession. Conversely, there is
the possibility, though probably not great, that an innocent person,
put under the pressure of adverse results, together with the evidence
that has been marshalled against him, may, due to the apparent hopelessness of the situation, be induced to confess. Even though there is
slight probability of such an eventuality, it might nevertheless be advisable to establish a safeguard against such a contingency. A possible arrangement would be to require that the suspect be brought
before a magistrate, prior to subjecting him to the test, and that he
be informed at that time that the results of the test may not be introduced into evidence. This could in some measure decrease the number
of confessions obtained from those who are guilty, but if the results of
the test reveal that the suspect has knowledge which is peculiar to the
person who committed the crime, the suspect may nevertheless be im109 Commonwealth v. Hippie, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A. 2d 353 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A. 2d 389 (1941). See also, State v. De Hart, 242 Wisc. 562,
8 N. W. 2d 360 (1943).
110 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that a confession, having followed defendant's involuntary submission to a lie detector test, was inadmissible. People v. Sims,
395 Ill. 69, 69 N. E. 2d 336 (1946) ; the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a confession which followed the application of a lie detector test, accompanied by very prolonged and persistent questioning, was inadmissible as involuntary, the court noting
that continued questioning and accusations to the point of exhaustion will render a
confession inadmissible. Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P. 2d 111 (1945).
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pelled to confess when confronted with such results. Furthermore, the
results would still be available to the investigative agencies, which,
having been furnished leads by the subject's responses, could proceed
to gather additional evidence for conviction.
V.

CONCLUSION

THE out of court use of the lie detector may therefore be accelerated, with society directly, and the judicial structure indirectly,
falling heir to the benefits. This, however, should be accomplished
within limitations and with safeguards in the nature of those suggested, or others to be developed, in order that the benefits do not
indirectly and inadvertently become a burden. With regard to the
admission of the results of the lie detector test into evidence, the
writer would urge a thoughtful second look at this entire problem in
the light of the analysis presented herein, lest a step be taken which
should appear almost patently unobjectionable, but which could in its
ultimate effect undermine the established concepts of the judicial
process.

